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Abstract. We investigate mergers in markets where quality differences between
products are central and firms may reposition their product lines by adding or
removing products of different qualities following a merger. Such mergers are ma-
terially different from those studied in the existing literature. Mergers without
synergies may exhibit a product-mix effect which raises consumer surplus, but only
when the pre-merger industry structure satisfies certain observable features. Post-
merger synergies may lower consumer surplus. The level of, and changes in, the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index may give a misleading assessment of how a merger
affects consumers. A merger may benefit some outsiders but harm others.
1. Introduction
Competition authorities around the world recognize the importance of accounting for quality
in merger policy.1 In many industries, products differ substantially in terms of quality, and
some firms supply multiple different qualities while others specialize in either low or high
quality. Mergers in such industries raise a number of interesting questions. For example,
how does a merger affect the overall level of output and the equilibrium mix of qualities?
What does observed product-line repositioning, by either merging firms or their rivals, tell
us about the likely welfare effects of a merger? Do synergistic cost reductions always benefit
consumers? Under what conditions are mergers profitable? And how should a competition
authority screen mergers?
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There is surprisingly little research on mergers in markets where quality is important. We
provide a framework to analyze such mergers. Specifically, we incorporate mergers into a
simplified version of the quantity-setting framework of Johnson and Myatt (2006) where
products are of either low or high quality. Consumers differ in how much they value quality.
Firms have arbitrary costs of supplying low and high quality, and simultaneously choose
an output for each of the two products. Our focus on Cournot competition implies that
our results are most applicable to industries where firms choose capacities in advance and
then set prices. We allow for endogenous quality and product-line choice by asymmetric
firms, the prospect that firms may reposition their product lines by adding or removing
product qualities following a merger, and the possibility that a merged entity has a better
cost structure than any of its constituent firms.
Our model is specialized in that it assumes quantity competition and that products are
not horizontally differentiated. At the same time, we find that mergers in our framework
are materially different from those that have been previously studied. As such, our results
suggest that caution may be required when assessing mergers in markets where quality plays
an important role in consumer decision making.
Our first results involve the effects of mergers on industry supply, prices, and consumer
surplus. We emphasize a new economic effect associated with mergers, which we call the
product-mix effect. This effect represents the change in the mix of different qualities consumed
in the market that is due to a merger. Surprisingly, the product-mix effect can be so strong
that a merger—even one exhibiting no cost synergies—increases consumer surplus.
The prospect of a merger with no synergies increasing consumer surplus is absent from
single-product Cournot markets.2 It is typically presumed that the market-power effect of a
merger leads to lower industry output (and necessarily lower consumer surplus) unless there
is a strong countervailing synergy effect (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990). With multiple qualities,
we show that total output (across all qualities combined) always decreases following a merger
with no synergies—in line with the classic market-power effect—but that the product-mix
effect may lead to increased output of higher quality products, and a reduction in their price,
so that consumer surplus may rise.
Although the presence of multiple qualities necessarily provides additional flexibility for how
mergers may affect consumer surplus, it is not true that anything can happen following
a merger in a multiproduct industry. As already noted, total output across all qualities
combined always declines. Moreover, consumer surplus can only increase if the pre-merger
market structure satisfies certain observable necessary conditions. One such condition is that
2In a model with homogeneous goods where consumers vary in their consideration sets, Armstrong and Vickers (2020)
show that a merger can increase consumer surplus by changing the nature of competitive pricing interactions.
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the pre-merger market structure is asymmetric, with some firms having different product lines
than others; hence a complete picture of mergers must allow for such asymmetries.
Our results hold even though we allow both merging and non-merging firms to change their
product lines following a merger. Such post-merger product-line repositioning is widely
considered to be important.3 Our results suggest that it can be hard to infer the effect
of a merger on consumers based on observed product-line repositioning. On the one hand,
we show that a merger can increase consumer surplus even if the merging parties remove a
product from their product line. On the other hand, we also show that if two firms selling
only high quality merge, then consumer surplus decreases even if rivals introduce high-quality
products in response.4
We also consider how merger-induced cost synergies influence market outcomes. In some
cases, synergies induce unfavorable product-mix effects and lower consumer surplus. For
example, a cost synergy that reduces a merged multiproduct firm’s cost of low quality en-
courages this firm to decrease its supply of high quality, possibly harming consumers.
Our second set of results explores broader welfare effects of mergers. We show that some
outsiders may benefit from a merger while others lose. We also find that a merger may raise
both outsiders’ profits and consumer surplus. This contrasts with single-product Cournot
models, where all outsider firms gain or lose, and a merger increases outsider profits if and
only if it harms consumers. We note that, in practice, support by rival firms for a merger is
often interpreted as a sign that the merger is anti-competitive and thus harmful to consumers
(and vice versa)—our analysis suggests this can be misguided. We also examine a merger’s
“external effect”, namely its impact on the sum of consumer surplus and outsider profits.
Contrary to single-product models with quantity competition, we show that the external
effect can be positive even when merging firms supply a high share of a product’s output.
We then assess the effectiveness of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a merger screen.
We show that, in the absence of our novel product-mix effect, a merger is more likely to harm
consumers when the change in the HHI is larger—mirroring an insight from single-product
Cournot markets (Nocke and Whinston, 2020). But when our product-mix effect is present, a
merger without synergies may raise consumer surplus even when both the level of and change
in the HHI far exceed levels deemed harmful by the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
Our final results revisit the classic question of whether horizontal mergers are profitable.
Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983), Levin (1990), and Cheung (1992) have argued that
3For example, in a November 9, 1995 speech, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division of the
U.S. Department of Justice, Carl Shapiro, argued that merger assessment should “try to account for any likely and
timely changes in prices or product offerings by non-merging parties, including product repositioning and entry.”
4This is consistent with the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) challenge to the approval of the merger between
(high-quality) organic grocers Whole Foods and Wild Oats; one justification for the original approval was the district
court’s view that rival grocers could introduce their own organic food lines (Boberg and Woodbury, 2009).
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Cournot mergers are often unprofitable for insiders (absent synergies or fixed-cost savings)
due to the competitive responses of outsiders. Their results imply that, for general demand
systems, insiders must control at least 50% of pre-merger market output in order to gain from
merging. Our analysis suggests that with multiple quality-differentiated products mergers
are profitable in a wider variety of circumstances. In particular, insiders need not control
significant pre-merger market share for a merger to be profitable. Moreover, in some cases,
a merger between two firms is profitable even as the number of rivals becomes very large.
Despite the ubiquity of multiproduct firms and the importance of product quality, much of
the theoretical literature on mergers focuses on single-product firms and exogenous quality.5
Exceptions to the assumption of exogenous quality include Federico, Langus, and Valletti
(2018) and Motta and Tarantino (2018). They assume that each firm, pre-merger, sells a
single product but chooses that product’s quality. They find that a merger must exhibit
significant innovation synergies for it to increase consumer surplus.6 An exception to the as-
sumption of single-product firms is Nocke and Schutz (2019), who consider mergers between
multiproduct firms using a nested CES/logit framework. They reduce multiproduct compe-
tition to a single dimension and argue that many of the classic results from single-product
markets hold, such as mergers reducing consumer surplus in the absence of synergies.
Our paper is also related to a growing literature on merger simulation with endogenous prod-
uct choice. (See Crawford, 2012 for an early survey.) Post-merger product repositioning has
been documented in several markets, including those for broadcast radio (Berry and Waldfo-
gel, 2001), music radio (Sweeting, 2010), and airlines (Li et al., 2019). Many papers find that,
after accounting for repositioning, mergers decrease consumer surplus.7 For instance Gandhi
et al. (2008) numerically solve a price-location Hotelling game. They show that merging
firms tend to move their products further apart, which reduces how much consumers are
harmed by a merger. Mazzeo, Seim, and Varela (2018) numerically solve a model where
firms choose whether or not to supply pre-set horizontally differentiated products. They
show that merging firms often stop supplying a product, which increases how much con-
sumers are harmed by a merger. However in some cases a merger increases consumer surplus
because it induces entry by a new firm. An important difference between this work and ours
is that we consider a setting with vertical rather than horizontal product differentiation. We
5These studies typically assume quantity competition (Perry and Porter, 1985; Levin, 1990; McAfee and Williams,
1992) or price competition with horizontally differentiated products (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985).
6In contrast Jullien and Lefouili (2018) argue that the relationship between mergers and innovation is ambiguous.
Moraga-González, Motchenkova, and Nevrekar (2019) show that when firms engage in winner-takes-all innovation
contests, a merger may raise consumer surplus by inducing firms to reallocate their efforts across the different contests.
7Papers which use structural methods typically find that merging firms remove or degrade products, while non-
merging firms add or improve products. Depending on which effect dominates, product repositioning can either
exacerbate (e.g. Draganska, Mazzeo, and Seim, 2009 and Fan, 2013) or mitigate (e.g. Wollmann, 2018 and Li et al.,
2019) the negative effect of a merger on consumer surplus due to higher prices. However in all these papers mergers
harm consumers. An exception is Byrne (2011) who finds that mergers create scale efficiencies and benefit consumers.
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find that mergers without synergies can raise consumer surplus due to a novel product-mix
effect, which can arise even when insiders remove a product, no outsider changes its prod-
uct line, and no new entry occurs. Gandhi et al. (2008) and Sweeting (2010) argue that
repositioning can explain why outsiders may oppose mergers that are unlikely to generate
synergies. In our setting with vertical rather than horizontal product differentiation, we also
find that a merger without synergies may harm outsiders, but this can occur even when no
firm chooses to adjust its product line.
The remainder of our manuscript is laid out as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 assesses the impact of mergers on prices, quantities, and consumer surplus, both
with and without synergies. Section 4 provides an assessment of external effects and the
profitability of mergers for outsiders. Section 5 assesses the role of the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index as a merger screen. Section 6 investigates merger profitability. Section 7 concludes.
2. Model
We introduce mergers into a two-quality version of Johnson and Myatt (2006). Specifically,
there are two vertically differentiated products of quality qL > 0 and qH > qL. Buyers are
indexed by θ. A consumer of type θ is willing to pay at most v(θ, q) for a single unit of a
product with quality q, where v(θ, q) is increasing in both of its arguments and satisfies the
usual sorting condition: v(θ, qH) − v(θ, qL) is increasing in θ. Consumers have quasilinear
preferences and purchase a single unit of the product that offers the greatest non-negative
surplus, and otherwise buy no product. Amongst a unit mass of potential buyers, for z ∈ [0, 1]
we let θ(z) be the buyer type for which there are z buyers with higher values of θ, where θ(z)
is strictly decreasing and twice differentiable in z. If θ is distributed according to F (θ) then
θ(z) = F−1(1− z). We take v(θ(1), q) = 0; some consumers do not purchase in equilibrium.
There is a finite number of horizontally undifferentiated firms. Two or more firms, denoted
by I, are insiders who merge together. Firms not involved in the merger are outsiders and
are denoted by O. Prior to the merger firm i ∈ I ∪O has a constant marginal cost ci1 ≥ 0 for
low-quality products and a constant marginal cost ci2 ≥ ci1 for high-quality products. After
the merger each firm i ∈ O keeps the same marginal costs as before, while the merged firm
i = m has constant marginal costs cm1 ≥ 0 and cm2 ≥ cm1 for low and high quality respectively.
Firms have no capacity constraints and no fixed costs. All costs are common knowledge.
Both before and after the merger, firms simultaneously set outputs. An equilibrium is a set
of quantities for each firm i such that i is maximizing its profits taking as given the output
of all other firms. We do not assume that each firm supplies a positive quantity of both
products but instead allow for completely arbitrary equilibrium outcomes.
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Market Clearing Prices. We will analyze our model using the “upgrades approach” pre-
viously used by Johnson and Myatt (2003, 2006) and Anderson and Çelik (2015). Let Zi1
denote the total number of units of low and high quality combined that firm i produces, and
let Zi2 denote the number of high-quality units that i produces. Necessarily, Z
i
1 ≥ Zi2 and





1 be the industry supply of units of either quality (so Z1 is the total number




2 be the industry supply of high-quality
units. The marginal buyer of the low-quality product is indifferent between purchasing that
product and nothing. Because the total number of units for sale is Z1, the marginal buyer
is of type θ(Z1) and hence the price of the low-quality good is
P1(Z1) = v(θ(Z1), qL).
Rather than directly deriving the price of the high-quality good we will instead find the
price that the marginal consumer would pay to “upgrade” from low to high quality. This
upgrade price depends on the type of the consumer who is indifferent between buying low or
instead high quality. Given that there are Z2 high-quality products available, this marginal
consumer has type θ(Z2) and is willing to pay P2 to upgrade to high quality, where
P2(Z2) = v(θ(Z2), qH)− v(θ(Z2), qL).
Conceptually, we imagine that there exist Z1 “baseline” units that consumers purchase at
price P1 and that there are Z2 “upgrades” available for purchase at price P2. The total price
for a high-quality good is thus P1 + P2.
Product Lines. Firm i produces Zi1 baseline units and Z
i
2 ≤ Zi1 upgrades, meaning it
produces Zi1 − Zi2 ≥ 0 low-quality products. Hence the profit πi of firm i is given by
πi =(Zi1 − Zi2)[P1(Z1)− ci1] + Zi2[P1(Z1) + P2(Z2)− ci2]
=Zi1[P1(Z1)− ci1] + Zi2[P2(Z2)− (ci2 − ci1)]. (1)
Firm i sells Zi1 baseline units at margin P1(Z1) − ci1 and also sells Zi2 upgrades at margin
P2(Z2)− (ci2 − ci1), where ci2 − ci1 is firm i’s “upgrade cost” from low quality to high quality.
By construction P1(Z1) depends only on the number of baseline units Z1, not the number of
upgrades Z2, and the upgrade price P2(Z2) depends only on the number of upgrades Z2, not
the total number of products Z1. This implies that firm i can separately maximize its profits
from baseline units and from upgrades: Zi1 and Z
i
2 can be chosen independently, subject only
to the “upgrade constraint” Zi1 ≥ Zi2.
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If firm i is selling both products then its upgrade constraint is not binding and at the
















A firm that in equilibrium sells only low-quality products (so that Zi2 = 0) must satisfy only
the first condition above (for it to be optimal not to sell any high-quality goods it must be
that P2(Z2) ≤ ci2 − ci1). For a firm that sells only high-quality products it has a binding
upgrade constraint (Zi1 = Z
i
2 = Z
i) and must satisfy the single first-order condition
[P1(Z1) + P2(Z2)] + Z





If there were no firms selling only high-quality products, then the equilibrium values of Z1
and Z2 could be found independently simply by using the first-order conditions given above.




, for k ∈ {1, 2}.
Assumption 1 (Decreasing Marginal Revenue). In each market k ∈ {1, 2} marginal revenue
is strictly decreasing. That is, for each k,
Pk(Z) + Z
iP ′k(Z)
is strictly decreasing in Z for any Zi ∈ [0, Z]. This is equivalent to σk(Z) < 1.8
We close with an important lemma from earlier work (Johnson and Myatt, 2006).
Lemma 1 (Existence and Uniqueness). There exists an equilibrium and it is unique.
3. The Impact of Mergers on Consumer Welfare
In this section we address the classic question of what effect horizontal mergers have on
consumer surplus. Economists and regulators often posit that horizontal mergers have two
primary effects: a market-power effect from consolidation of decisions regarding key choice
variables such as output, which harms consumers, and a synergy effect from improvements
in the merging firms’ cost structure, which benefits consumers. Thus, it is often presumed
that a merger which exhibits no synergies must harm consumers (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990).
8To verify the stated equivalence, note that differentiating Pk(Z) +Z
iP ′k(Z) with respect to Z shows it is decreasing
for each Zi ∈ [0, Z] if and only if P ′k(Z) + ZiP ′′k (Z) < 0 for each Zi ∈ [0, Z], whereas σk(Z) < 1 if and only if
P ′k(Z) + ZP
′′
k (Z) < 0. For a given Z, if P
′′
k (Z) ≤ 0 then both conditions clearly hold. For a given Z, if P ′′k (Z) > 0
then the first condition is hardest to satisfy for Zi = Z but at that value the conditions are identical.
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In contrast to this classic viewpoint, we will emphasize the importance of what we call the
product-mix effect, which is that a merger may change the equilibrium mix of products that
are consumed. Most strikingly, this may benefit consumers when some firms become more
aggressive following a merger, as in our quantity-setting framework. We also show that in
some cases synergies lower consumer surplus.
We begin by considering the impact of mergers on consumer surplus when there are no
synergies. After that, we investigate the effects of synergies.
Mergers with No Synergies. Following Farrell and Shapiro (1990), we say that when
there are no synergies the merged firm’s cost of producing any output vector equals the
minimum-cost method of producing it using the merging firms’ pre-merger technologies.
Definition 1 (No Synergies). Suppose that all firms i ∈ I merge to create a firm with
marginal cost for low-quality products given by cm1 and marginal cost for high-quality products
given by cm2 . This merger exhibits no synergies if c
m




2 = mini∈I c
i
2.
Observe that a merger with no synergies nonetheless may allow the merged entity to have a
more attractive variable cost structure than any of its constituent firms alone. The merged
entity may wish to reallocate (or rationalize) its output, for example by shifting all of its
low-quality output to the plant with the lowest marginal cost for low-quality products. Also
observe that such an improved variable cost structure may alter the merged entity’s optimal
product mix or product line in addition to its optimal level of overall production.9
We now provide several results addressing the impact of a merger on consumer surplus. We
first consider how aggregate output Z1 (across all firms and qualities combined) responds.
Proposition 1. A merger with no synergies leads to a strict reduction in aggregate output,
measured across all firms and qualities: Z1 strictly decreases (and so the price of the low-
quality good strictly increases).
Proposition 1 is the analogue of a leading result in the single-product, identical quality
analysis of Farrell and Shapiro (1990), who show that mergers without synergies must reduce
aggregate output.10 In a single-product world, a reduction in aggregate output necessarily
raises the price of the product and therefore harms consumers. This is the basis for the classic
market-power effect, which says that absent synergies a merger must harm consumers.
But importantly, in a multiproduct industry total output Z1 is not a sufficient statistic for
consumer surplus. Rather, the product-mix effect must also be considered, so that both
9For example, a multiproduct firm acquiring a firm that only sells low quality but which has a lower marginal cost
will experience an increase in its cost of upgrading to high quality and will, all else equal, increase its total production
but reduce its supply of high quality (and may even remove the high quality good from its product line).
10Although an intuitive result, proving it in a multiproduct setting is much more subtle. For example, we must allow
firms to adjust their product lines.
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total output and the industry product mix between low and high quality are assessed; Z2
must also be known. If a merger were to increase Z2 then the price of the high-quality good
might decrease, which would make some consumers better off. In principle, this might raise
overall consumer surplus.
Can a merger with no synergies indeed cause a beneficial product-mix effect, raise the in-
dustry output of high quality, and increase consumer surplus? The answer is yes. Our first
step in showing this is to provide observable necessary conditions for Z2 to increase.
Necessary Conditions for the Supply of High Quality to Increase. We identify the following
necessary conditions for Z2 to increase following a merger with no synergies.
Proposition 2. If a merger with no synergies raises the aggregate output of high-quality
products, then pre-merger
(1) some firm in the industry sells only high-quality products, and
(2) some merging firm sells low-quality products.
To illustrate item 1, consider a simple example in which no firm sells only high quality and
a merger occurs involving firms selling only low quality. We know from Proposition 1 that
aggregate output must go down. Given that no firm’s upgrade constraint was binding pre-
merger, each firm not involved in the merger will raise its own total supply. However, doing
so further relaxes each multiproduct firm’s upgrade constraint—no firm changes its supply
of high-quality products and so the merger does not affect Z2.
11,12
Additionally, as indicated by item 2, for Z2 to increase some merging firm must be selling
low quality. Otherwise, necessarily all merging firms sell only high quality and intuitively the
direct effect of such a merger is a reduction in these firms’ combined high-quality output.
Although other firms may potentially raise their high-quality supply in the post-merger
equilibrium, such increases are insufficient to counteract the reduction by the merging firms.
We now present a powerful corollary of Proposition 2. To be clear, the product line of a
firm is the set of qualities that it produces in positive quantities, and an industry exhibits
asymmetric product lines if there are at least two firms that sell different product lines.
Corollary 1. If a merger with no synergies raises the aggregate output of high-quality prod-
ucts, then pre-merger the industry exhibits asymmetric product lines.
Corollary 1 indicates that product-line asymmetry—not merely cost asymmetry across firms—
is essential for a merger without synergies to increase the supply of high quality output (and
11When no firm sells only high quality, other types of merger—for example between two multiproduct firms, or a
multiproduct firm and a firm selling only low quality—may strictly decrease Z2.
12A corollary is that if pre-merger all firms supply only low quality, then absent synergies, a merger will not lead to
product innovation because no firm will add high quality to its product line.
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consumer surplus). To see how Corollary 1 follows from Proposition 2, consider the three
distinct ways in which an industry could exhibit symmetric product lines: (i) if all firms sell
only low quality pre-merger, then no firm sells only high quality and item 1 fails, (ii) if all
firms are multiproduct pre-merger, then no firm sells only high quality and item 1 again fails,
and (iii) if all firms sell only high quality pre-merger, then any merger necessarily involves
only such firms and so no merging firm sells low quality, so that item 2 is not satisfied.
We close our discussion of necessary conditions by emphasizing that Proposition 2 and
Corollary 1 hold even though firms may reposition their product lines following a merger, by
either adding or removing products. For example, if no merging firm sells low quality pre-
merger, then the aggregate output of high-quality products cannot increase—even if rivals
respond by introducing their own high-quality products.
Sufficient Conditions for the Supply of High Quality to Increase. We now turn to circum-
stances under which a merger without synergies definitely raises the supply of high quality,
so that a beneficial product-mix effect occurs.
Proposition 3. Consider a merger with no synergies in which, pre-merger, at least one
firm in the industry is strictly producing only high-quality products.13 The merger strictly
increases the aggregate output of high-quality products if either
(1) each of the merging firms produces only low-quality products before the merger, or
(2) at most one merging firm sells high-quality products and any such firm has a marginal
cost for low quality that is no higher than that of any other merging firm.
Item 1 from Proposition 3 is intuitive. If each merging firm produces only low quality, then
the direct effect of the merger is for the merged entity to curtail its output of low-quality
products, reducing Z1. Such a reduction encourages those firms producing only high-quality
products to expand their output. Although multiproduct firms may in turn produce fewer
high-quality goods, the equilibrium effect is an increase in Z2. The same reasoning guarantees
that Z2 increases if one merging firm produces high quality (item 2), so long as that firm
does not have a higher cost of producing low-quality products than other insiders.14
We are now in a position to definitively show that a merger can not only raise Z2 but moreover
that this increase can be substantial enough to lower the price of high-quality goods enough
to raise consumer surplus. Consider the following example.
13Firm i is “strictly” selling only high-quality products if, facing an equilibrium value Z2 and its own optimal quantity






2 − ci1. This rules out knife-edge cases where
a firm sells only high-quality units but is, to first order, indifferent between doing that and instead slightly reducing
the number of high-quality units it sells and slightly raising its output of low-quality products from zero.
14If its cost of producing such products were higher, the upgrade cost of the merged firm, cm2 − cm1 , would be higher
than that of the firm producing high-quality, which would cause a direct effect of the merger to be a decrease in the
merged firm’s high-quality output, potentially overturning the result. We return to this point later in the section.
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Example 1. Consumers have multiplicatively separable preferences, so that a consumer of
type θ who purchases a product of quality q has utility v(θ, q) = θq. Also, θ ∼ F (θ) with
F (θ) = θ1/α for α ∈ (0, 1).
For Example 1, the demand functions for low quality and upgrades to high quality are
P1(Z1) = qL(1− Z1)α, and
P2(Z2) = (qH − qL)(1− Z2)α.
These are concave for α ∈ (0, 1) and satisfy our assumption of decreasing marginal revenue.
There are three firms. All firms have the same cost c1 = 0.1 for low quality. One firm i has
upgrade costs ci2− ci1 = c2− c1 = 0.1 but the other two firms have upgrade costs so high that
they only produce low quality. Low quality is set at qL = 1 while qH and α vary.
Figure 1 illustrates the effect on consumer surplus of a merger between a firm producing only
low quality and the firm capable of producing high quality. On the x-axis relative quality
varies from qH/qL = 3 to qH/qL = 5. The four curves depict different values of the demand
parameter α, ranging from α = 0.1 (the top solid curve) to α = 0.4 (the bottom thin curve).
In all these parameterizations the merger is both privately profitable and beneficial for the
outsider firm. In many cases the merger also increases consumer surplus. For example, when
qH/qL = 3 and α = 0.1 consumer surplus increases by 6.71%; most consumers purchase high
quality, and so consumer gains are not limited to a small “luxury segment”. It is therefore
possible that consumers overall, insider firms, and outsider firms all gain from a merger—
something which cannot occur in a single-product Cournot model.15
We note that in all these parameterizations the merged firm sells only high quality. The
merged firm therefore removes the low-quality product from its portfolio and yet consumer
surplus can still increase. As in our discussion of the repositioning defense following Corol-
lary 1, this suggests caution in making inferences regarding consumer surplus based on either
the observed addition or removal of products from industry participants’ portfolios.
The parameterizations in Figure 1 suggest that the merger is more likely to increase con-
sumer surplus—and to increase it by more—when qH/qL is higher and α is lower. Although
both parameters affect pre- and post-merger equilibrium in a complicated way, a first-pass
intuition is as follows. In all parameterizations the firm capable of producing high quality
chooses to specialize in it prior to the merger; the merger therefore decreases Z1 but increases
Z2. Heuristically, consumers are more likely to benefit from the merger when the increase
in Z2 is large relative to the decrease in Z1, and when they place more value on Z2. One
effect of an increase in qH is indeed that consumers value upgrade output more highly. One
15For all parameterizations in Figure 1, a merger between the two low quality firms induces the same change in
consumer surplus (and benefits the high-quality outsider) but is not profitable (absent fixed cost savings). However,
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Figure 1. A plot of the percentage change in consumer surplus due to a merger between a
low-quality firm and the firm capable of supplying high quality qH , based on Example 1. The
demand parameter is either α = 0.1 (thick solid curve), α = 0.2 (dashed curve), α = 0.3 (dotted
curve), or α = 0.4 (thin solid curve). Other parameters are fixed at (qL, c1, c2) = (1, 0.1, 0.2).
effect of a decrease in α is that all else equal σ1(Z1) − σ2(Z2) becomes more negative, that
is baseline demand becomes relatively more concave and upgrade demand relatively more
convex. Intuitively, when σ1(Z1) is smaller, an equilibrium decrease in Z1 leads to a larger
increase in the merged firm’s marginal revenue. The merged firm must therefore increase its
output. However when σ2(Z2) is larger, its marginal revenue is less sensitive to Z2. Hence a
larger increase in Z2 is needed to re-equilibrate the industry.
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Sufficient Conditions for Consumer Surplus to Increase. It is unfortunately difficult to pro-
vide general conditions under which a merger increases Z2 by enough that overall consumer
surplus goes up. However the Online Appendix provides results for two special cases. First,
we examine a merger between two firms where one of the insiders is inefficient and so has a
very small market share. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for consumer sur-
plus to increase. Second, we consider a merger between firms with arbitrary market shares.
Assuming that baseline and upgrade demands have constant (but different) curvatures, we
provide a sufficient condition for a merger between two low-quality firms to increase con-
sumer surplus. Consistent with the above discussion, in both cases the condition is easier to
satisfy when σ1(Z1) is smaller and σ2(Z2) larger at the pre-merger equilibrium.
16This intuition is closely related to the literature on third-degree price discrimination such as Robinson (1933),
Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985), Cowan (2007), and Aguirre, Cowan, and Vickers (2010) where curvature differ-
ences across markets are central in determining output effects from discrimination.
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The Effects of Synergies. For a merger involving firms i ∈ I, a synergy for product k
means that the merged firm m’s marginal cost cmk is lower than mini∈I c
i
k. Johnson and
Myatt (2006) show that a reduction in a firm’s marginal cost (or, in our merger setting, a
synergy that reduces cmk below mini∈I c
i
k) can cause Z1 and Z2 to move in opposite directions.
We complement their work by identifying when such a product-mix effect does and does not
arise and by considering the resulting impact on consumer surplus.17
Specifically, in this subsection we suppose that a merger has already been consummated, lead-
ing to some level of post-merger consumer surplus. We look at how synergies—that is, reduc-
tions in post-merger marginal costs cm1 and c
m
2 below mini∈I c
i
1 and mini∈I c
i
2 respectively—
affect this level of post-merger consumer surplus.
We first identify when synergies work as in a single-product setting, unambiguously raising
post-merger consumer surplus. For analytical convenience we state our results in terms of
small synergies, that is small reductions in post-merger marginal costs as just discussed.
Proposition 4. Assume a merger has taken place. A small synergy increases post-merger
consumer surplus in the following three cases.
(1) The merged firm only produces high quality and its cost of high quality decreases.
(2) No firm produces only high quality, and
(a) the merged firm is multiproduct and its cost of high quality decreases, or
(b) the merged firm only produces low quality and its cost of low quality decreases.
All of the cases considered in Proposition 4 are straightforward in that they involve no
interesting product-mix effects; synergies (weakly) increase both Z1 and Z2, thus raising
consumer surplus. For the case in which the merged firm produces only high quality there is
a strategic linkage between the two markets. However, because the merged firm is upgrade-
constrained, the direct effect of the synergy is an equal increase in m’s output in both the
baseline and upgrade markets. Although other firms respond by lowering their own outputs,
the response is not enough to overturn the direct effect; both prices fall as a result of such
a synergy. For the two cases in which no firms produce only high quality, the result holds
because (i) there is no strategic linkage between the baseline and upgrade markets because no
firm is upgrade-constrained, and (ii) the synergy only affects one marginal cost of relevance.18
Beyond Proposition 4, synergies can lower consumer surplus. Rather than provide an ex-
haustive analysis, we focus on synergies influencing a multiproduct firm’s cost of low quality.
Similar forces emerge for other cases.
17With homogeneous goods Cournot, synergies may reduce welfare (see for example Schwartz, 1989). With differen-
tiated goods Cournot, synergies can also increase prices under certain conditions (see Chen and Li, 2018).
18To better understand condition (ii), note that in case 2a the synergy lowers the firm’s upgrade cost but does not
change its baseline cost, while in case 2b for the firm with the synergy only one product is relevant and its cost falls.
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In the following proposition, let n∗∗ and nL∗∗ be respectively the total number of firms and
the number of firms supplying only low-quality products after the merger.
Proposition 5. Assume a merger has taken place and the merged firm is producing both
products. A small synergy that reduces the merged firm’s cost of the low-quality product:
(1) increases post-merger industry aggregate output but reduces the post-merger industry
supply of high quality,
(2) increases the post-merger price of high quality products if and only if
nL∗∗ − σ1(Z1) + σ2(Z2) > 0, (4)




n∗∗ − nL∗∗ + 1− σ2(Z2)
n∗∗ + 1− σ1(Z1)
. (5)
Intuitively, if the merged firm is multiproduct and its cost of low quality cm1 decreases, then its
upgrade cost cm2 −cm1 increases and so it expands total output but lowers high-quality output.
Although other firms adjust their outputs in response, the final effect is an increase in overall
industry supply and a decrease in high-quality supply. The price of high-quality products is
more likely to increase, and consumer surplus more likely to decrease, when σ1(Z1) is low
and σ2(Z2) high, and when more of the firms in the industry supply only low quality. This
is because, in these circumstances, marginal revenue is more sensitive to changes in baseline
output but less sensitive to changes in upgrade output—and so the expansion in baseline
units due to the synergy is small relative to the decrease in upgrade units.
We now use Example 1 to illustrate the effect of synergies. Here there are two firms, one
of which produces only low quality and the other of which is a multiproduct firm. The
multiproduct firm enjoys a synergy which reduces its cost of low quality. As before, qL = 1
and (absent the synergy) both firms have cost for low quality given by c1 = 0.1. The demand
parameter takes four different values—α ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4}. We set qH = 3, and make the
upgrade cost c2−c1 = 1.75 so that the multiproduct firm indeed wishes to sell both products.
Figure 2 shows that synergies can harm consumers. For example when α = 0.1, a 20%
synergy reduces consumer surplus by 1.12%. Imagining that the multiproduct firm recently
acquired another firm, if the merger would lower consumer surplus without synergies, then
these synergies make the merger even worse. Our parameterizations also suggest that a
synergy is more likely to reduce consumer surplus when α is smaller. Recalling our earlier
discussion, this is because for the demand system in Example 1 a decrease in α tends to
make baseline demand more concave and upgrade demand more convex.19
19Proposition 5 shows that qH has no direct bearing on whether synergies benefit consumers. However simulations
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Figure 2. A plot of the percentage change in consumer surplus due to a percentage synergy
on the low-quality product, based on Example 1. The demand parameter is either α = 0.1 (thick
solid curve), α = 0.2 (dashed curve), α = 0.3 (dotted curve), or α = 0.4 (thin solid curve). Other
parameters are fixed at (qL, qH , c1, c2) = (1, 3, 0.1, 1.85).
4. Outsider Profits and External Effects
In this section we first examine the impact of a merger on the profits of outsider firms. After
that, we study a merger’s external effect, which is defined as the merger-induced change in
the sum of consumer surplus and outsider profits.
Outsider Profits. In a single-product quantity-setting market each outsider benefits from
a merger if and only if it lowers industry output and consumer surplus; although some
outsiders may gain (or lose) more than others, if one gains (or loses) then they all do. We
first show that the same is true in our multiproduct setting if there is no product-mix effect.
Proposition 6. If a merger weakly decreases both Z1 and Z2 then all outsider firms are
weakly better off and consumers are weakly worse off. (The reverse is true if the merger
weakly increases both Z1 and Z2.)
If Z1 and Z2 decrease then the prices of both products increase, and this benefits all outsiders
while harming consumers.
On the other hand, when there are product-mix effects some outsiders may gain from a
merger while other outsiders lose. For example, a merger could raise the price of low quality
while reducing the price of high quality. Intuitively this benefits an outsider that only sells
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low quality but may harm an outsider that only sells high quality.20 Hence some outsiders
may support a merger while others oppose it.
Moreover, when there are product-mix effects, outsider profit and consumer surplus may both
increase or both decrease following a merger. For example, Figure 1 depicts examples where
both increase.21 As discussed in the Introduction, this runs counter to the common intuition
that if rival firms support a merger then it must be anti-competitive and thus harmful to
consumers, whereas if rival firms oppose a merger it must be beneficial to consumers.
External Effects. We now turn to the external effect of a merger. As pointed out by
Farrell and Shapiro (1990), when the external effect of a merger is positive then—assuming
that only mergers which benefit insiders are proposed—the merger increases total surplus.
As such, our analysis here complements our earlier results on consumer surplus.
As a preliminary step, we first consider the external effect due to small but arbitrary changes
dZ1 and dZ2 in equilibrium total and upgrade outputs respectively. To this end we denote
firm i’s share of total output by si1(Z1, Z2) and of upgrade output by s
i
2(Z1, Z2); to ease the
exposition we henceforth omit their dependence on Z1 and Z2.
























The external effect associated with small output changes dZ1 and dZ2 can therefore be
written as the sum of an external effect in the baseline market plus an external effect in the
upgrade market—each of which has the same form as the external effect derived by Farrell
and Shapiro (1990) for infinitesimal mergers in a standard single-product setting.
Now consider the external effect of a complete merger. Conceptually, a complete merger can
be thought of as a sequence of small output changes dZ1 and dZ2, with the sequence starting
at pre-merger outputs (Z∗1 , Z
∗




2 ). The external
20For a more formal, stark example, consider the following. First, take a market with only three firms, and suppose
that a merger between two of them strictly increases P1(Z1), strictly decreases P1(Z1)+P2(Z2), and makes the outsider
strictly better off. (Figure 1 depicts, and footnote 15 discusses, examples where this happens.) Let P1(Z
∗
1 ) + P2(Z
∗
2 )
denote the pre-merger price of high quality. Second, suppose we add a fourth firm with marginal costs c1 = c2 =
P1(Z
∗
1 ) + P2(Z
∗
2 ) − ε. Note that for ε > 0 small this new firm is active before but not after the merger, and so is
made worse off by the merger. At the same time, by continuity the other outsider still gains from the merger.
21It is also straightforward to construct examples where both decrease. Suppose that, pre-merger, there are two
multiproduct firms, and one firm that produces only low quality because its cost of high quality is prohibitively large.
Suppose the two multiproduct firms merge, and enjoy a synergy such that Z1 increases by an arbitrarily small amount
while Z2 decreases. This merger reduces both consumer surplus and the outsider firm’s profit.
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effect of a complete merger is then obtained by integrating equation (6) over this sequence.
Clearly the sequence of output changes depends on the particular merger being considered.
We now examine three different types of merger (without synergies) and derive conditions
such that the external effect is positive. We let sI∗1 and s
I∗
2 denote insiders’ pre-merger shares
of total and upgrade output, and si∗1 and s
i∗
2 denote the same for an outsider firm i ∈ O.
Our first results pertain to mergers where there is no product-mix effect.
Proposition 7. Suppose that no firm produces only high quality before the merger. Consider
a merger without synergies, in which either
(1) each of the merging firms produces only low-quality products before the merger, or
(2) one of the merging firms is multiproduct before the merger, and its marginal cost for
low quality is no higher than that of any other merging firm.









The mergers described in Proposition 7 lead to a strict decrease in total output Z1 but
no change in upgrade output Z2. Under a restriction on demand curvature, their external
effect is positive provided that insiders’ pre-merger share of total output is not too large;
the precise condition (7) is the same as the one derived by Farrell and Shapiro (1990) for
output-decreasing mergers in a standard single-product environment.22,23
The intuition behind condition (7) is that firms with a low share of total output are relatively
inefficient, and so a merger between them raises external surplus by increasing the output
of more efficient outsiders. Interestingly, note that condition (7) does not depend on market
shares for low-quality supply. This is because low-quality products compete not only against
other low-quality units but also against the baseline units that are ultimately upgraded to
high quality. Consequently—and counter to the intuition one might have based on single-
product models—a merger between two low-quality firms with large shares of low-quality
output can have a positive external effect. This happens if, for example, outsiders are large
multiproduct firms that mainly sell high-quality.
Continuing with mergers where there is no product-mix effect, we have the following result.
Proposition 8. Consider a merger without synergies, in which each of the merging firms
produces only high quality before the merger. Suppose that one of them has marginal costs
22Proposition 7 requires that demand curvature satisfies σ′1(Z1) ≥ 0. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) allow for non-constant
marginal costs, but impose stronger conditions P ′′1 (Z1) ≥ 0 and P ′′′1 (Z1) ≥ 0 on demand.
23Our analysis here is also related to Nocke and Schutz (2019) who, in a setting with multiproduct price competition,
provide conditions on pre-merger equilibrium variables such that a complete merger’s external effect is positive.
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for low and high quality that are no higher than those of any other merging firm. Assuming
















The merger described in Proposition 8 leads to strict decreases in both total output Z1 and
upgrade output Z2. Under a restriction on demand curvature, the external effect is positive
provided that insiders’ pre-merger shares of both total and upgrade outputs are not too
large. Insiders’ share of total output is again important because the baseline units that they
upgrade compete with outsider firms’ low-quality units.24
Now consider mergers between low- and high-quality firms that have a product-mix effect.
Given some restrictions on pre-merger industry participants we obtain the following result.
Proposition 9. Suppose that before the merger one firm in the market produces only high
quality. Consider a merger without synergies between it and other firms that have weakly
higher marginal costs and produce only low quality before the merger. Assuming that σ′1(Z1) ≥
















The merger described in Proposition 9 leads to a strict decrease in total output Z1 but a
strict increase in upgrade output Z2. Under the usual restriction on demand curvature,
the external effect is positive provided that insiders’ pre-merger share of total output is not
too large, and their pre-merger share of upgrade output is not too small. Consequently—
and again counter to the intuition from single-product models—a firm with a large share of
high-quality output may merge and generate a positive external effect. This happens if, for
example, outsiders are large firms that sell predominantly low-quality products.
We note that checking conditions (7)-(9) requires information on demand curvature. Some-
times information on passthrough rates can be used to infer demand curvature. For example,
if the pre-merger industry structure satisfies the conditions in Proposition 7, then a unit in-
crease in each of the n firms’ marginal costs causes the price of low quality to increase by
n/[n + 1 − σ1(Z1)]. Knowledge of pre-merger passthrough rates and how they change can
therefore give (local) information on σ1(Z1) and σ
′
1(Z1). Moreover, even if curvature cannot
be estimated or inferred, some progress can still be made. Returning to Proposition 7, note




1 (1− si∗1 ).
Therefore if one is willing to assume that curvature increases (or does not decrease too fast),
pre-merger market shares alone can be used to establish a positive external effect.25
24Note that the two conditions in (8) are equivalent in the special case where v(θ, q) = θq and all firms supply only
high-quality products before the merger, because σ1(Z
∗
1 ) = σ2(Z
∗








2 for each i ∈ O.
25The assumption in Proposition 7 that σ′1(Z1) ≥ 0 is sufficient but not necessary to prove the result.
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5. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a common measure of industry concentration. In





When screening mergers for potential harm, antitrust authorities often use the “naively com-
puted” post-merger HHI and the merger-induced change in HHI—where “naively computed”
means that the merged firm’s market share is assumed to equal the sum of the insiders’ pre-
merger market shares, and each outsider’s market share is assumed to be the same pre- and
post-merger. The change in HHI due to a merger between firms j and k is thus
∆HHI = (sj + sk)2 − (sj)2 − (sk)2 = 2sjsk. (11)
Note that HHI ranges from 0 to 10000, while ∆HHI ranges from 0 to 5000.
The 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMG) state that mergers “potentially raise
significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny” if they induce an HHI between
1500 and 2500 and a ∆HHI above 100, or if they induce an HHI above 2500 and a ∆HHI
between 100 and 200. Meanwhile mergers are “presumed to be likely to enhance market
power” (and harm consumers) if they induce an HHI above 2500 and a ∆HHI above 200.26
Next, we revisit the rationale for using HHI and ∆HHI to screen mergers in a single-product
market. We then examine whether this rationale extends to a multiproduct setting.
Single-Product Markets. Nocke and Whinston (2020) note that, while there is no clear
relationship between the level of HHI and how a merger affects consumers, changes in the
HHI can be useful in assessing the impact of a merger.27 Specifically, they note that in a
single-product setting a merger harms consumers unless it induces a synergy which lowers
the merged firm’s cost below a critical level. They prove that if two firms with identical cost
c merge and enjoy a post-merger marginal cost cm, this critical (synergy-induced) marginal










26See www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010 for the U.S. merger guidelines. One advan-
tage of the HHI and ∆HHI are their low information requirements. More elaborate options such as the SSNIP test
(Katz and Shapiro, 2003; O’Brien and Wickelgren, 2003) and its multiproduct firm extension (Moresi, Salop, and
Woodbury, 2008) require detailed cost data as well as estimates of certain diversion ratios.
27Note that a higher level of the HHI is indicative of firms having greater market power. Cowling and Waterson
(1976), Kwoka (1985), and Spiegel (2019) show that HHI is proportional to, respectively, the ratio of industry profit
to industry revenue, share-weighted price-cost margins, and the ratio of industry profit to consumer surplus.
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where ε is demand elasticity. Consequently, given uncertainty over any realized synergies, a
merger is “more likely” to harm consumers when ∆HHI is larger.28
Multiproduct Markets. Now we provide some conditions under which changes in HHI
are predictive of how a merger affects consumers in a multiproduct setting. As earlier, we
let Z∗1 and Z
∗





be firm i’s share of those outputs.
Proposition 10. Suppose that no firm produces only high quality before the merger. Con-
sider a merger between two firms j and k who, prior to the merger, produce only low quality
and do so at the same cost c1. The merger has no effect on aggregate outputs Z1 and Z2 if

















the change in the HHI measured over total output.
We know from earlier analysis that, absent synergies, the merger described in Proposition
10 does not lead to a product-mix effect and so harms consumers. As a result, the critical
(synergy-induced) cost such that the merger does not change outputs—and therefore also
does not change consumer surplus—has the same form as in Nocke and Whinston (2020).29
As in single-product markets, this suggests that higher changes in HHI require higher levels of
synergy for consumers to benefit. There is, however, an important caveat to this conclusion.
As the marginal cost of the merged firm further decreases (below ĉm1 defined above), the
total output of the merged firm also increases. This may lead some multiproduct firms to
remove the low-quality product from their product line, and also to reduce their output of
high-quality products. If this occurs, then consumer surplus could fall compared to the pre-
merger situation. Therefore, although we can conclude that higher changes in HHI require
a higher synergy to maintain output at pre-merger levels, we cannot conclude that synergies
above this level ensure that consumer surplus exceeds pre-merger levels. Unless, that is, we
are confident that no firms in the industry will adjust their product lines.
Continuing with mergers where, absent synergies, there is no product-mix effect—and so the
merger reduces outputs and harms consumers—we have the following result.30
28Nocke and Whinston (2020) generalize equation (12) to the case where merger insiders have asymmetric costs. One
can show that the insights from Propositions 10 and 11 below hold if, prior to the merger, insiders sell the same
products but have different costs.
29For tractability we focus on the critical marginal cost which ensures that Z1 and Z2 are the same pre- and post-
merger. Note that there might be other costs which induce the same consumer surplus but different Z1 and Z2.
30One can also show that if two symmetric multiproduct firms merge, and no firm produces only high quality before
the merger, then the critical post-merger costs (ĉm1 , ĉ
m
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Figure 3. A plot of the naively computed post-merger HHI (left panel) and the change in
the HHI (right panel) against the percentage change in consumer surplus due to a (synergy-less)
merger between a low-quality firm and the firm capable of supplying high quality qH , based on
Example 1. The demand parameter is either α = 0.1 (thick solid curve), α = 0.2 (dashed curve),
α = 0.3 (dotted curve), or α = 0.4 (thin solid curve). Different points along each curve correspond
to different values of qH ∈ [3, 5]. Other parameters are fixed at (qL, c1, c2) = (1, 0.1, 0.2).
Proposition 11. Consider a merger between two firms j and k that produce only high quality
before the merger, and have the same cost c2. The merger has no effect on aggregate outputs
Z1 and Z2 if the insiders’ post-merger marginal cost c
m





























l the change in the HHI for total (l = 1) or upgrade (l = 2) output.
Proposition 11 shows that the critical (synergy-induced) cost for a merger between two high-
quality firms has a similar form to Nocke and Whinston (2020). However, a caveat is that
there are in fact two not one relevant HHI values to consider, that regarding total output
(HHI1) and that regarding only high-quality output (HHI2). Increases in either of these
raise the required synergy. Additionally, we can see that the ideal threshold in a given market
depends on both of these HHI values, and so considering only one of them may lead to a
threshold that is biased. From this observation, a final caveat emerges: in a multiproduct
market, there ought to be a sliding scale involving HHI changes. For example, a merger with
a higher value of ∆HHI1 might be permitted if it also had a lower value of ∆HHI2.
We now close by examining mergers where, absent synergies, there is a product-mix effect,
and show that under these circumstances the thresholds in the HMG may not provide correct
guidance. Figure 3 illustrates the effect of a merger between a low- and a high-quality firm
when there are no synergies, there is one low-quality outsider, and demand follows Example
1. We take each market depicted in Figure 1, naively compute the change in HHI and
the corresponding post-merger HHI (involving total market shares), then plot these against
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the merger-induced equilibrium change in consumer surplus. (Thus, each curve depicts a
different demand parameter α, while along each curve qH varies between 3 and 5.)
Figure 3 shows that a merger can benefit consumers when HHI exceeds 7500 and ∆HHI
exceeds 2300—far above the levels deemed harmful in the HMG.31 We emphasize again that
in the mergers we are considering in Figure 3, there are no synergies and so in a single
product world all of these mergers would necessarily harm consumers.
6. Merger Profitability
In this section we address the classic question of whether horizontal mergers without synergies
are profitable. On the one hand, insiders benefit from enhanced market power, which may
lower industry output and increase prices. On the other hand, insiders are harmed if outsiders
become more aggressive, for example by expanding output as in the standard quantity-setting
framework.
Indeed, Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) have argued that the competitive response of
outsiders often dominates, causing many horizontal mergers to be unprofitable. In a single-
product quantity-setting industry with linear demand and symmetric firms with constant
marginal costs, a necessary condition for a merger to be profitable is that the merging parties
have at least an 80% pre-merger market share. Even allowing for general demand functions,
both Levin (1990) and Cheung (1992) have shown that a 50% threshold is necessary.32
Linear Demand. We begin by assuming that consumers have multiplicative preferences
with θ distributed uniformly on [0, 1], a boundary case of Example 1 with α = 1. Hence
demand is linear as in the classic Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) analysis:
P1(Z1) = qL(1− Z1), and
P2(Z2) = (qH − qL)(1− Z2).
We place no restrictions on the cost structures of outsider firms. We do assume that the k+1
insiders have symmetric costs, which rules out profitability gains from output rationalization.
We also assume there are no synergies.
31Note that HHI and ∆HHI are high because this is a three-to-two merger. We pointed out in footnote 15 that a
merger between the two low-quality firms has the same effect on consumer surplus; one can show that for such a
merger HHI and ∆HHI are lower, but that consumers can benefit when HHI exceeds 6000 and ∆HHI exceeds 600.
32Perry and Porter (1985) show that if mergers allow firms to lower their average costs by combining their capital
stocks, then pairs of small firms with limited market shares may find it profitable to merge. Daughety (1990) shows
that if merging firms become Stackelberg leaders then smaller mergers may be profitable. Levin (1990) and Fauli-
Oller (2002) note that reallocation opportunities may make mergers more profitable. Nocke and Whinston (2010)
show that, allowing for synergies, mergers which increase consumer surplus are profitable. Deneckere and Davidson
(1985) show that many mergers are profitable when firms set prices.
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Let nL be the number of firms that are producing only low quality, nH the number producing
only high quality, and nM the number of multiproduct firms, where all variables reference
the pre-merger industry structure of firms with positive output. We assume each of these
firms is active post-merger and offers the same product line as before the merger. Where
appropriate we provide conditions on parameters that ensure this.
We begin with the case where each of the k + 1 merging firms produces only low quality.
Proposition 12. Suppose demand is linear and no firms are multiproduct (nM = 0). A







regardless of the number of firms nH producing only high quality.
Proposition 12 is in stark contrast to the existing literature. It shows that quality differences
may make mergers among quantity-setting firms more profitable than previously recognized.
To illustrate, suppose that nL = 2, and note that in Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) a
merger between two firms is never profitable unless the pre-merger industry is a duopoly. In
our multiproduct setting, such a two-firm merger is profitable so long as qH & 3.41qL, even
if the number of other firms in the industry (producing high quality) is infinitely large.33
The intuition for Proposition 12 is as follows. When the low-quality firms merge the direct
effect is a reduction in total output Z1. Firms producing only high quality respond by
raising their own output, but because they are upgrade-constrained they must raise both
their baseline and upgrade outputs. This blunts the competitive response to the merger in
terms of total output Z1.
34 Consequently the merger is more readily profitable for insiders.
So far we have emphasized how quality differences alter the usual conclusions about merger
profitability in quantity-setting markets. The following proposition continues this theme and
at the same time indicates some similarities with classic results.
Proposition 13. Suppose demand is linear. Consider a merger of k + 1 firms that produce
only low-quality products. A necessary condition for the merger to be profitable is that it






33To ensure that each firm has positive output certain conditions must hold. For example, suppose all outsiders are
symmetric with marginal cost for high quality cH2 , and let c
L
1 be the marginal cost of low-quality firms. Both insiders
and outsiders have positive output if cL1 /qL < c
H
2 /qH and (c
H
2 − cL1 )/(qH − qL) < 1.
34Consider an example where the number of responding firms nH is arbitrarily large. Post-merger Z1 cannot be the
same as its pre-merger level: if it were, then, because Z2 has increased, the price of high-quality products would be
lower than before the merger, which would imply that post-merger high-quality firms make negative profit.
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Remarkably, this is the same lower bound for merger profitability discovered by Salant,
Switzer, and Reynolds (1983). However, in their single-product analysis, all firms in the
industry have the same costs and so a necessary condition for profitability is that the merging
firms have at least 80% market share. In contrast, we emphasize that what matters is not
insiders’ share of output (either of the entire market or the low quality segment). Rather,
what matters is their share of all firms that produce low-quality products. In this sense, the
emphasis of the existing literature on the market shares of insiders is somewhat misplaced.
The spirit of our results above holds for other types of mergers. When the insiders produce
only high-quality products rather than low-quality products, our main results hold exactly.
Remark 1. Consider a merger involving k + 1 firms producing only high-quality products.
Swapping the nL and the nH terms, Propositions 12 and 13 hold exactly.
For example, a necessary condition for profitability is that at least 80% of firms producing
high-quality products take part in the merger, (k + 1)/(nH + nM) ≥ 8/10. Additionally,
mergers involving as few as two firms producing only high-quality can be profitable even
when the number of firms nL producing low-quality products grows infinitely large
Mergers involving only multiproduct firms or mixed mergers are more complicated analyt-
ically but lead to similar qualitative results. We do not present formal results but instead
note that a merger involving a fixed number of firms, each of which is a multiproduct firm
pre-merger, may be profitable even when there are an infinite number of firms.
Nonlinear Demand and the 50% Benchmark. Here we briefly address merger prof-
itability with nonlinear demand. Finding exact sufficient conditions for profitability is not
straightforward with asymmetric firms and so we focus on necessary conditions for mergers
to be profitable. We assume the insiders share the same pre-merger cost structure.
Proposition 14. A necessary condition for a merger between k+1 low-quality firms or k+1
high-quality firms to be profitable is that
k




where nj = nL or nH if the insiders are low quality or high quality, respectively.
At least roughly, a 50% benchmark does apply—but only in terms of the ratio of insiders to
the number of firms producing the same quality as the insiders. Additionally, it is possible to
show that if demand is concave instead of merely log-concave, then a different threshold can
be derived that is slightly harder to satisfy. This is in the spirit of Fauli-Oller (2002) who,
in a single-product setting, finds that mergers are more profitable when demand is convex.
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7. Conclusion
We have provided a quantity-setting framework for assessing mergers in markets where qual-
ity differences are central. Our framework allows for asymmetric firms which may sell mul-
tiple products, but which may also specialize in either low or high quality. Both merging
and non-merging firms may reposition their product lines by adding or removing products
following a merger. Using this framework, we address classic topics such as the welfare effects
of mergers, the use of the HHI as a merger screen, and the profitability of mergers.
Contrary to perceived wisdom, in our framework a merger without synergies may raise
consumer surplus, even if the merging parties remove a product from their product line.
Synergies, when present, may lower consumer surplus. Both of these results are driven by
a new economic force called the product-mix effect. Consumers can benefit from a merger
even when the level of, and changes in, HHI, far exceed those in the U.S. Horizontal Merger
Guidelines. Consumers may also benefit from a merger even when some outsiders gain as well;
this is contrary to the common wisdom that support for a merger by outsiders necessarily
indicates likely anti-competitive effect. In addition, a merger may benefit some outsiders but
harm others, depending upon which products they supply. Finally, we show that mergers
are more readily profitable when products are vertically differentiated.
At the same time, in some cases the predictions of our framework match those from models
where quality differences are not important and each firm sells a single product. For example,
a merger between two firms that sell only high-quality products unambiguously raises prices
and harms consumers in the absence of synergies, even if non-merging firms respond by
introducing their own high-quality products. Moreover, post-merger synergies in such a
merger reduce prices and benefit consumers.
Overall, we believe that our results suggest caution may be required when assessing mergers
in markets with vertical product differentiation.
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Appendix: Omitted Proofs
We require several lemmas. For lemmas 3 and 4, we let Z∗ and Z∗∗ denote two distinct
equilibria, one representing the industry before a merger and the other representing the
industry after the merger; it doesn’t matter which one is which. Similarly, Z∗k and Z
∗∗
k
represent industry upgrades in market k ∈ {1, 2}, and Zi∗k and Zi∗∗k represent firm i’s outputs.
We alert the reader that in this appendix we sometimes use the term “upgrades” to refer
both to market k = 1 and k = 2, whereas in the body of the manuscript we reserved the
term upgrades for market k = 2. We do this to avoid unnecessarily lengthening the proofs.
Lemma 3. Suppose that Z∗∗k ≥ Z∗k and Zi∗∗k ≥ Zi∗k where at least one inequality is strict.
(1) If, ignoring its monotonicity constraint, firm i has a weak incentive to raise its output
Zi∗∗k , then it has a strict incentive to raise its output Z
i∗
k when either (i) it is not
involved in the merger, or (ii) it is involved in the merger but has weakly lower cost
for upgrade k when it chooses Zi∗k .
(2) If, ignoring its monotonicity constraint, firm i has a weak incentive to lower Zi∗k , then
it has a strict incentive to lower Z∗∗ik when either (i) it is not involved in the merger,
or (ii) it is involved but has weakly higher cost for upgrade k when it chooses Zi∗∗k .
Proof. We prove the first claim; the second can be proven similarly. Because firm i has a
weak incentive to raise Zi∗∗k ignoring its upgrade constraint,
Pk(Z
∗∗






k ) ≥ Cik,
where Cik is firm i’s upgrade cost for k (c
i
1 if k = 1 and c
i
2 − ci1 if k = 2). (Recall what we
mentioned just before the statement of this lemma: in this appendix we will let the term
“upgrade” refer both to k = 1 and k = 2, in order to save space.) Since Z∗∗k ≥ Z∗k and












Finally, it is clear that this result continues to hold for the merged firm if the merged firm’s




k when choosing Z
i∗
k . 
Lemma 4. Suppose that Z∗∗k ≥ Z∗k and Zi∗∗k ≥ Zi∗k where at least one inequality is strict.
(1) If k = 1 then Zi∗∗1 = Z
i∗∗
2 provided firm i is not involved in the merger.




2 provided either (i) firm i is not involved in
the merger, or (ii) firm i is involved but has weakly lower cost for upgrade 2 when it
chooses Zi∗2 .
Proof. First consider k = 1. Because i could raise Zi∗1 but does not it must have a weak
incentive to lower Zi∗1 (ignoring its upgrade constraint). Using the second claim in Lemma 3,
i has a strict incentive to lower Zi∗∗1 . Because i does not lower Z
i∗∗
1 it must be upgrade
constrained and hence Zi∗∗1 = Z
i∗∗




does not it must have a weak incentive to raise Zi∗∗2 (again ignoring its upgrade constraint).
Using the first claim in Lemma 3, i has a strict incentive to raise Zi∗2 . (This is also true if i
faces a lower cost for upgrade 2 when it chooses Zi∗2 .) Because i does not raise Z
i∗
2 it must
be upgrade-constrained and hence Zi∗1 = Z
i∗
2 . 
In the proofs of Propositions 1, 2 and 3, let Z1 and Z2 represent post-merger equilibrium
outputs, and let Z̃1 and Z̃2 represent pre-merger equilibrium outputs.
Proof of Proposition 1: We begin by showing that Z1 ≥ Z̃1 and Z2 ≥ Z̃2 is impossible.
First, we prove that if to the contrary Z1 ≥ Z̃1 and Z2 ≥ Z̃2, then any firm i not involved
in the merger weakly decreases its supply of upgrade k = 1, 2. Suppose k = 1 and that
to the contrary Zi1 > Z̃
i




2. There are then
two subcases to consider. In the case where Z̃i1 = Z̃
i
2, such that i is upgrade-constrained
both pre- and post-merger, we immediately obtain a contradiction because Z1 and Z2 have
weakly increased and hence firm i cannot have optimally strictly increased its output. In
the case where Z̃i1 > Z̃
i













then the second part of Lemma 4 says that Z̃i1 = Z̃
i
2, which is also a contradiction. Since in
both cases we obtain a contradiction, we conclude that Zi1 ≤ Z̃i1. Now suppose k = 2 and
that contrary to what we claimed above, Zi2 > Z̃
i
2. The second part of Lemma 4 says that
Z̃i1 = Z̃
i






1. But by necessity Z
i
1 ≥ Zi2, and so Zi1 ≥ Zi2 > Z̃i2 = Z̃i1,
so that Zi1 > Z̃
i
1, which we showed just above (k = 1) cannot be. We conclude that Z
i
2 ≤ Z̃i2.
Second, we consider the merged firm. Without loss of generality, suppose the merger involves
firms 1 and 2 and that firm 1 has weakly lower cost for the low-quality good whilst firm 2 has
weakly lower cost for the high-quality good. We will refer to the merged firm as m. There
are two possible cases, according to whether Zm2 = 0 or Z
m
2 > 0. In the case where Z
m
2 = 0,
it must be true that Z̃12 = Z̃
2
2 = 0 otherwise Z2 ≥ Z̃2 definitely cannot hold (since we have
just shown that non-merging firms weakly lower their upgrade supply). However Z1 ≥ Z̃1
then implies that Zm1 ≤ Z̃11 . Since Z̃21 > 0 as well, we must have Z̃11 + Z̃21 > Zm1 , but this
contradicts the fact that Z1 ≥ Z̃1 (since again, non-merging firms weakly lower their baseline
supply). In the case where Zm2 > 0, since firm 2 has weakly lower upgrade costs than m,
and because we are supposing Z1 ≥ Z̃1 and Z2 ≥ Z̃2, firm 2 must have positive pre-merger
output, Z̃22 > 0. Summing m’s two first order conditions (or else using its single first order


























Because both firms 1 and 2 have positive supply of upgrade k = 1, for aggregate outputs not
to have fallen it must at least be that Zm1 > Z̃
2
1 , and similarly that Z
m
2 ≥ Z̃22 . But this ranking
of outputs means, because of decreasing marginal revenue, the fact that P ′1 < 0, P
′
2 < 0, and
Z1 ≥ Z̃1 and Z2 ≥ Z̃2, that both of the equations immediately above cannot be satisfied.
28
We conclude, from all of the work above, that if Z1 ≥ Z̃1, then it must also be that Z2 < Z̃2.
The final step of the proof is to show that Z1 ≥ Z̃1 and Z2 < Z̃2 is also impossible.
First, let U denote the set of all firms which are not involved in the merger and which strictly
increased their supply of baseline output following the merger. Hence for a firm i ∈ U it is
the case that Zi1 > Z̃
i





by definition Z̃i1 ≥ Z̃i2, it must be that Zi2 − Z̃i2 ≥ Zi1 − Z̃i1 > 0. Let U1 and U2 be the total














Note that U2 ≥ U1 > 0, based on the logic given just above.
Second, let D denote the set of all firms which are not involved in the merger and which
strictly decreased their supply of upgrade output following the merger. Hence for a firm
i ∈ D it is the case that Zi2 < Z̃i2. According to the second part of Lemma 4, firm i has
Zi1 = Z
i
2. Since by definition Z̃
i
1 ≥ Z̃i2, it must be that 0 > Zi2 − Z̃i2 ≥ Zi1 − Z̃i1. Define D1














Note that it must be that 0 > D2 ≥ D1. Additionally, it must be that D2 + U2 ≥ D1 + U1.
Third, consider the merging firms. As above, we will suppose without loss of generality
that the merger involves firms 1 and 2 and that firm 1 has weakly superior technology for
producing the low-quality good and that firm 2 has weakly superior technology for producing
the high-quality good. We will view the merger as removing firm 2’s output from the market
but also endowing firm 1 with firm 2’s better technology for the high-quality product. From
this perspective, the total output change involving the merging firms in market k is given
by the change in firm 1’s output minus the lost output of firm 2, (Z1k − Z̃1k) − Z̃2k . Let
∆Z1k = Z
1
k − Z̃1k denote the change in firm 1’s output in market k.
We can now complete the proof and show that it is not possible that Z1 ≥ Z̃1 and Z2 < Z̃2.
These inequalities require, as necessary conditions, that
∆Z11 +
(
D1 + U1 − Z̃21
)
≥ 0, and (15)
∆Z12 +
(
D2 + U2 − Z̃22
)
< 0. (16)
As indicated above, D2 + U2 ≥ D1 + U1. Also it must be that Z̃21 ≥ Z̃22 . Therefore,
D2 + U2 − Z̃22 ≥ D1 + U1 − Z̃21 .
One possibility is that D1 + U1 − Z̃21 ≥ 0, which implies D2 + U2 − Z̃22 ≥ 0. To satisfy (16),
∆Z12 must be negative. But then using the same logic as for firms in set D, it must also be
that 0 > ∆Z12 ≥ ∆Z11 . But this implies that ∆Z11 +D1 +U1− Z̃21 ≤ ∆Z12 +D2 +U2− Z̃22 < 0
which means (15) cannot hold. (Note that part of the logic given for firms in D appeals to
Lemma 4 for the case of k = 2, which will also hold for the merged firm because the merged
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firm is firm 1 with firm 2’s superior technology for the high-quality good which means firm
1 operates post-merger with a reduced upgrade cost compared to pre-merger.)
The other possibility is that 0 > D1 + U1 − Z̃21 . For (15) to hold, it must be that ∆Z11 > 0.
Following logic given for firms in set U , it must be that ∆Z12 ≥ ∆Z11 > 0. But then it must
be that ∆Z12 +D2 +U2 − Z̃22 ≥ ∆Z11 +D1 +U1 − Z̃21 ≥ 0, which means (16) cannot hold. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider item 1. We prove that if no firm sells only high-quality
products pre-merger then Z2 ≤ Z̃2.
Suppose that no firm’s monotonicity constraint binds before the merger, and that contrary
to what was just stated, Z2 > Z̃2. We now prove that no firm wishes to strictly increase its
output of upgrade k = 2 following the merger, yielding a contradiction.
We only do this for the merging firms because simpler logic applies to other firms. Without
loss of generality, suppose that the merger involves firms 1 and 2, and that firm 2 has a
weakly lower cost for the high-quality good. We may view the merger as removing firm
1’s output from the market, and endowing firm 2 with a cost min (c11, c
2
1) for low quality
and a cost c22 for high quality. To complete the proof, it is then sufficient to show that,
following the merger, firm 2 does not strictly raise its supply of upgrades. On the way to
a contradiction, suppose that in fact Z22 > Z̃
2
2 . Because firm 2 could lower Z
2
2 but does
not it must have a weak incentive to raise Z22 (ignoring its upgrade constraint). Moreover
firm 2’s upgrade cost when it chooses Z22 is c
2
2 − min (c11, c21), which is weakly higher than
its upgrade cost c22 − c21 when it chooses Z̃22 . Hence using the first claim in Lemma 3, firm
2 must have a strict incentive to raise Z̃22 . But this contradicts the assumption that firm 2
was not upgrade-constrained prior to the merger.
Now consider item 2 of the proposition. We prove that if no merging firm sells low-quality
products then Z2 ≤ Z̃2.
Suppose that all merging firms sell only high-quality before the merger, and that contrary
to what was just stated, Z2 > Z̃2.
We start by showing that any firm i that, pre-merger, produces both qualities (and hence is
not involved in the merger) must weakly lower its upgrade output after the merger. Suppose
to the contrary that Zi2 > Z̃
i





this contradicts the assumption that i’s upgrade constraint does not bind pre-merger.
Next, we show that any firm i that, pre-merger, produces only low-quality or produces both
qualities must strictly raise its baseline units after the merger. Suppose to the contrary that
Zi1 ≤ Z̃i1. The first claim in Lemma 4 implies that Z̃i1 = Z̃i2, which again contradicts the
assumption that i’s upgrade constraint does not bind pre-merger.
We now consider firms that were producing only high-quality pre-merger, which includes the
firms involved in the merger. Without loss of generality, suppose that the merger involves
firms 1 and 2, and that firm 1 has a weakly lower cost for the low-quality good. We may
view the merger as eliminating firm 2, and endowing firm 1 with a cost c11 for low quality
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and a cost min (c12, c
2
2) for high quality. Note that one effect of the merger is to eliminate the
pre-merger output of firm 2, given by Z̃21 = Z̃
2
2 > 0.
Let D denote the set of firms that were upgrade-constrained pre-merger and which strictly
reduce their supply of baseline units following the merger: i ∈ D if and only if Z̃i1 = Z̃i2 and
Zi1 < Z̃
i
1. Since by definition Z
i
1 ≥ Zi2, it must be that Zi2− Z̃i2 ≤ Zi1− Z̃i1 < 0 for each i ∈ D.
Let U denote the set of firms that were upgrade-constrained pre-merger and which strictly
increase their supply of upgrades following the merger: i ∈ U if and only if Z̃i1 = Z̃i2 and
Zi2 > Z̃
i
2. (We know that no firm which is not upgrade-constrained pre-merger increases its
upgrade supply, and so U contains all firms that increase their upgrade supply). Since by
definition Zi1 ≥ Zi2, it must be that 0 < Zi2 − Z̃i2 ≤ Zi1 − Z̃i1.
Finally, since we assumed Z2 ≥ Z̃2, the increased upgrade supply of firms in U must at least
weakly exceed the combined lost upgrade supply of firm 2 and also firms in D. That is



























However this says that firms in D and U have increased their baseline output by more than
firm 2’s pre-merger output. Using Proposition 1, Z1 must have strictly decreased. Hence
there must exist some firm i /∈ U ∪D that has strictly lowered its output Zi1. But any firm
i /∈ D which strictly lowers its baseline output must have been producing only low-quality
or both qualities prior to the merger, and we showed above that there are no such firms.
We arrived at this contradiction by assuming Z2 ≥ Z̃2. Hence we conclude that this merger
strictly lowers the market supply of high-quality products. 
Proof of Proposition 3: We first prove item 1. We know from Proposition 1 that Z1 < Z̃1.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that in fact Z2 ≤ Z̃2. Using the techniques already
developed in earlier proofs, it is easy to show that any firm i that produces both products
pre-merger has weakly higher upgrade output post-merger.
Now consider any firm i that strictly produces only high-quality goods pre-merger. We claim
that i sells strictly more upgrades post-merger. First, suppose firm i only sells high quality
post-merger. Because Z1 has strictly decreased and Z2 has weakly decreased, firm i must
be selling strictly more units. Secondly, suppose instead that firm i sells both low- and
high-quality goods post-merger. Suppose also, on the way to a contradiction, that Zi2 ≤ Z̃i2.
Because by assumption firm i has a strict incentive to raise Z̃i2 ignoring its upgrade constraint,
a slight adaptation of the proof of Lemma 3 shows that it has a strict incentive to raise Zi2.
But since this is feasible and yet firm i doesn’t do it, we obtain a contradiction.
In summary, the total upgrade supply of non-merging firms strictly increases. Because each
non-merging firm was producing zero upgrades, this contradicts Z2 ≤ Z̃2.
Item 2 follows from observing that if the high-quality insider has weakly lower costs for low
quality than the low-quality insiders, then the merger is equivalent to eliminating the other
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insiders from the market. Z1 strictly falls. If Z2 weakly fell, then all high-quality firms
would strictly increase their output in the post-merger equilibrium and each multiproduct
firm would weakly increase its upgrade output, contradicting Z2 weakly falling. (This is true
for a firm that strictly sells only high quality; the claim weakly holds otherwise.) 
We will use the following result in subsequent proofs.
Lemma 5. Suppose a “target” firm has total output exogenously fixed at Z. Outputs are
taken to be equilibrium ones given Z. Excluding the target firm, let L denote firms that
produce only low quality, H denote firms that produce only high quality, andM denote firms
that produce strictly positive amounts of both low and high quality. Let |L|, |H| and |M| be
their respective numbers, and let N = |L|+ |H|+ |M|. Define φ = P ′1(Z1)/[P ′1(Z1)+P ′2(Z2)].
An infinitesimal increase in Z leads to infinitesimal output changes dZ1 and dZ2 where:
































































2 where r = 0 if the target
supplies low quality and r = 1 if it supplies high quality. Summing the first line of (2) over























P ′1 (Z1) + (|H|+ |M|)P2 (Z2) +(
Z2 − rZ
)

























For item 1 outputs are determined by (19), and also (20) if |M| > 0, and also (21) if
|H| > 0—all with r = 0. For item 2 outputs are determined by (19) and (20), and also (21)
32
if |H| > 0 – all with r = 1. Totally differentiating and solving gives the stated expressions. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Note that equations (19)–(21) from Lemma 5 generally determine
equilibrium outputs, even taking Z = 0 and without any “target firm,” as we now assume
to be the case. |L|, |H|, |M| denote the number of firms producing respectively only low
quality, only high quality, or both products after the merger.
To prove item 1, consider a synergy that reduces ci2 for a firm i ∈ H. Totally differentiating
(19)–(21) and solving gives dZ1 > 0 and dZ2 > 0. This implies that prices of both low and
high quality strictly decrease. Hence consumer surplus strictly increases.
To prove item 2a, consider a synergy that reduces ci2 for a firm i ∈ M. Note that |H| = 0.
Totally differentiating (19) gives dZ1 = 0, and totally differentiating (20) gives dZ2 > 0. This
implies that the price of low quality is unchanged, while the price of high quality strictly
decreases. Hence consumer surplus strictly increases.
To prove item 2b, consider a synergy that reduces ci1 for a firm i ∈ L. Again |H| = 0. Totally
differentiating (20) gives dZ2 = 0, and totally differentiating (19) gives dZ1 > 0. This im-
plies that prices of both goods strictly decrease. Hence consumer surplus strictly increases. 
Proof of Proposition 5: As in the proof of Proposition 4, equilibrium outputs are
determined by equations (19) and (20), and also (21) when |H| > 0—all with Z = 0.
Consider a unit decrease in ci1 for a firm i ∈ M. Totally differentiating and solving gives







n∗∗ + 1− σ1(Z1)
n∗∗ − nL∗∗ + 1− σ2(Z2)
, (22)
where n∗∗ ≡ N and nL∗∗ ≡ |L|. Item 1 then follows. Next, note that the change in the price
of high quality is P ′1(Z1)dZ1 + P
′
2(Z2)dZ2, while consumer surplus is∫
θ(Z1)
[v (θ, qL)− P1 (Z1)] dF (θ) +
∫
θ(Z2)
[(v (θ, qH)− v (θ, qL))− P2 (Z2)] dF (θ) , (23)
so its derivative is −Z1P ′1(Z1)dZ1 − Z2P ′2(Z2)dZ2. Substituting (22) gives items 2 and 3. 
Proof of Proposition 6: For k = 1, 2, let Z∗k and Z
∗∗
k be pre- and post-merger equilibrium
outputs, and let Zi∗k and Z
i∗∗
k be outsider i’s pre- and post-merger equilibrium outputs.
Suppose that Z∗∗1 ≤ Z∗1 and Z∗∗2 ≤ Z∗2 . The first part of the proof of Proposition 1 establishes
that Zi∗∗1 ≥ Zi∗1 and Zi∗∗2 ≥ Zi∗2 . Hence Z∗∗1 −Zi∗∗1 ≤ Z∗1−Zi∗1 and Z∗∗2 −Zi∗∗2 ≤ Z∗2−Zi∗2 . This
implies that firm i’s profit is weakly higher after the merger, because i could always choose
outputs Zi∗1 and Z
i∗
2 after the merger and be no worse off than before it. Meanwhile consumers
are weakly worse off after the merger because P1(Z
∗∗
1 ) ≥ P1(Z∗1) and P2(Z∗∗2 ) ≥ P2(Z∗2).
The proof when Z∗1 ≥ Z∗∗1 and Z∗2 ≥ Z∗∗2 follows the same steps and so is omitted. 
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1 (Z1) dZ1. (25)
The firm’s first order condition is P1 (Z1)−ci1+Zi1P ′1 (Z1) = 0, and its total derivative implies
dZi1 = − [1− (Zi1/Z1)σ1 (Z1)] dZ1. Substituting these into (25) and noting that Zi2 = 0, we
obtain the expression in (24).
Second, a multiproduct firm i has profit πi = Zi1 [P1 (Z1)− ci1] + Zi2 [P2 (Z2)− (ci2 − ci1)].
Since the firm chooses Zi1 and Z
i
2 independently, we can follow the same steps as we did for
a low quality firm and derive the expression for dπi in (24).
Third, consider a high quality firm i. Its profit is πi = Zi [P1 (Z1) + P2 (Z2)− ci2], and so
dπi = dZi
[
P1 (Z1) + P2 (Z2)− ci2
]
+ Zi [P ′1 (Z1) dZ1 + P
′
2 (Z2) dZ2] . (26)
The firm’s first order condition is
P1 (Z1) + P2 (Z2)− ci2 + Zi [P ′1 (Z1) + P ′2 (Z2)] = 0,


















where φ = P ′1 (Z1) / [P
′
1 (Z1) + P
′
2 (Z2)]. Substitute these into (26) and rearrange to get (24).
Next, recall from the proof of Proposition 5 that the change in consumer surplus is
dCS = −Z1P ′1(Z1)dZ1 − Z2P ′2(Z2)dZ2. (27)
To obtain the expression for dE , sum (24) over all firms i ∈ O and add (27), then use the
definitions si1 ≡ Zi1/Z1 and si2 ≡ Zi2/Z2. 
Proof of Proposition 7: Let a be the “acquirer”, who in item 1 is an insider that produces
low quality at cost ca1 = mini∈I c
i
1, and in item 2 is the multiproduct insider. Conceptually
the merger has two stages. In the first stage a’s cost of producing high quality falls (weakly)
to mini∈I c
i
2. In the second stage the output of firms I\a is removed from the market.
We first prove that outputs at the first stage are the same as before the merger. For item









1 ≥ ca1 this implies that P2(Z∗2) ≤ mini∈I ci2−ca1. Therefore
fixing others’ outputs at their pre-merger level, firm a (still) produces no upgrades when it
has costs ca1 and mini∈I c
i




2 are equilibrium outputs then follows.




2 − ca1, while each








1 for all j ∈ I\a this implies that
ca2 = mini∈I c
i




2 are the equilibrium outputs.
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We now turn to the second stage. Consider a sequence where the output Z
I\a
1 of firms in
I\a is reduced from its pre-merger level down to 0, and at each point all firms not in I\a
choose outputs optimally. According to Lemma 5 a reduction in Z
I\a
1 leads to a decrease in
Z1 but no change in Z2 provided no firm supplies only high quality. No firm supplies only
high-quality at the start of the sequence. Moreover, as Z1 falls but Z2 remains constant, each
firm in a ∪ O has its upgrade constraint relaxed; hence no firm supplies only high quality























1 . Moreover the proof of Proposition 1 shows that as Z1 decreases (and Z2
remains unchanged) each outsider weakly raises its output and hence also its share si1 of to-
tal output. Combined with Assumption 1 and the assumption that σ′1(Z1) ≥ 0, this implies
that the curly-bracketed term is decreasing in Z1 and hence is positive for all Z1 ∈ [Z∗∗1 , Z∗1 ].
Therefore (28) is positive. 
Proof of Proposition 8: Let a be one of the insiders with the lowest cost for both low
and high quality. Consider a sequence where the (total and upgrade) output ZI\a of firms
I\a is reduced from its pre-merger equilibrium level ZI\a∗ down to 0, and at each point firms

































where to ease the exposition we suppress the dependence of Z1 and Z2 on Z
I\a. According
to Lemma 5 both dZ1/dZ
I\a and dZ2/dZ
I\a are positive. A sufficient condition for a positive
external effect is thus that the two curly-bracketed terms are positive. The proof that both
are indeed positive closely follows the proof of Proposition 7, and so is omitted. 
Proof of Proposition 9: As in the proof of Proposition 8 consider a sequence where the
output ZI\a of non-acquiring insiders is reduced to 0. The external effect is given by (29).
According to Lemma 5 a reduction in Z
I\a
1 leads to a decrease in Z1 and a (weak) increase
in Z2. Therefore as Z
I\a
1 decreases each outsider i ∈ O raises its share si1 of total output and
(weakly) lowers its share si2 of upgrade output. Following the same steps as in Proposition
8, this ensures that the first curly-bracketed term in (29) is positive. Using the opposite
reasoning, the second term in curly brackets is negative, such that the overall external effect
of the complete merger is positive given that Z1 has decreased and Z2 has weakly increased. 
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Proof of Proposition 10: If Z1 and Z2 are the same pre- and post-merger, then outsiders’
outputs must also be the same pre- and post-merger, which in turn implies that the merged
firm’s outputs equal the sum of the insiders’ pre-merger outputs. Using the first part of




1 ⇐⇒ ĉm1 =
∑
i∈I
ci1 − P1(Z∗1), (30)
and also that for any i ∈ I,
ci1 = P1(Z
∗
1)(1− si∗1 /ε1). (31)







where si∗1 = s
∗
1 for each i ∈ I. Using ∆HHI1 = 2(s∗1)2 we can rewrite (32) as (13). Finally,
note that if cm1 = ĉ
m
1 and there is no synergy on high quality, insiders do indeed optimally
supply only low quality after the merger. 
Proof of Proposition 11: Using the same argument as in the preceding proof, the two




2 ⇐⇒ ĉm2 =
∑
i∈I
ci2 − P1(Z∗1)− P2(Z∗2), (33)





2)][1− ρsi∗1 /ε1 − (1− ρ)si∗2 /ε2]. (34)




ρs∗1/ε1 + (1− ρ) s∗2/ε2
1− ρs∗1/ε1 − (1− ρ) s∗2/ε2
, (35)
where si∗l = s
∗
l for each i ∈ I. Using ∆HHIl = 2(s∗l )2 we can rewrite (35) as (14). Finally,
note that if cm2 = ĉ
m
2 and there is no synergy on low quality, insiders do indeed optimally
supply only high quality after the merger. 
We will use the following lemma in the proofs of Propositions 12 and 13.
Lemma 6. A merger of k + 1 firms producing only low quality is profitable if and only if
k + 1 ≤
[
1 + nL + nM + γ
1 + nL + nM + γ − k
]2
, where γ =
[nH(nM + 1)qL]
[(nM + 1)qH + nH(qH − qL)]
.
Proof. Conceptually we imagine that k insiders cease production, and firm i is the insider
that “survives” the merger. Letting Z∗∗1 denote the total post-merger industry output and
Zi∗∗1 firm i’s post-merger output, this i’s post-merger first-order condition is
P1(Z
∗∗






1 ) = qL(1− Z∗∗1 )− qLZi∗∗1 = ci1.
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This allows firm i’s post-merger profits—and hence the post-merger profits of the k + 1
merging firms—to be written as (P1(Z
∗∗
1 )− ci1)Zi∗∗1 = qL(Zi∗∗1 )2. Using similar computations,
the pre-merger profit of each of the k + 1 insiders is qL(Z
i∗
1 )
2, where Zi∗1 is such a firm’s
pre-merger output. Thus, a merger is profitable if and only if
(Zi∗∗1 )
2 ≥ (k + 1)(Zi∗1 )2.
We now solve for Zi∗∗1 /Z
i∗
1 . Let K be the set of the k firms who cease production following
the merger. Note that by symmetry these firms’ pre-merger output is kZi∗1 . We model the
merger as a series of infinitesimal mergers, which reduce these firms’ output from kZi∗1 to 0,
and let ZK1 denote their output at an arbitrary point along this merger ‘path’.
Using firm i’s first order condition and P ′1 (Z1) = −qL, an infinitesimal merger induces firm
i to change its output by dZi1 = −dZ1. Take equations (19)-(21) in the proof of Lemma
5 and substitute r = 0, |H| = nH , |M| = nM and also |L| = nL − k (since k initially
low-quality firms no longer optimize their output). Totally differentiating, an infinitesimal
merger induces a change in total output of
dZ1 = −
[
nH (1− φ) + nM + 1
]
[nL − k + nM + 1] [nH (1− φ) + nM + 1] + nHφ [nM + 1]
,
where φ = qL/qH . Since dZ
i













nL − k + nM + 1 + γ
.
Substituting this into the above profitability condition then gives the stated result. 
Proof of Proposition 12: The righthand side of the inequality in Lemma 6 is decreasing in




qL/ (qH − qL).
Hence by substituting nM = 0, k = nL − 1, and γ = qL/ (qH − qL) into the inequality in
Lemma 6 we obtain a sufficient condition for the merger to be profitable. Rearranging this
condition leads to the one stated in the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 13: The righthand side of the inequality in Lemma 6 is decreasing in
γ. Hence by substituting γ = 0 we obtain the following necessary condition for profitability:
k + 1 ≤
[
1 + nL + nM
1 + nL + nM − k
]2
. (36)
Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) show that this cannot hold if (k+1)/(nL+nM) < 8/10.
The necessary condition stated in our proposition then follows immediately. 
Proof of Remark 1: The proof follows those of Lemma 6 and Propositions 12 and 13. 
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Proof of Proposition 14: For brevity we only prove this result for a merger between
k + 1 low-quality firms. We prove that if the stated condition fails to hold, an infinitesimal
merger reduces the joint profit of the merger insiders.
Closely following the proof of Lemma 6, let firm i be the surviving insider, and ZK1 be the
output of the k other insiders that are being removed from the market (at an arbitrary point




















P ′1 (Z1) dZ1.
Since firm i is optimizing, we can use its first order condition to replace P1 (Z1)− ci1 and to



















A sufficient condition for the merger to be unprofitable is that, at all points along the merger
path, the curly-bracketed term is strictly positive. Since dZ1 < 0 this is harder to achieve
when ZK1 /Z
i




1 reaches its maximum pre-merger (when it equals k), so we
obtain the following sufficient condition for the merger to be unprofitable:
1 +
(







Take equations (19)-(21) and set r = 0, Z = ZK1 , |H| = nH , |M| = nM , and |L| = nL − k
(as k initially low-quality firms no longer optimize). Totally differentiating, we find
dZ1 ≥ −
{











Hence our sufficient condition for the merger to be unprofitable reduces to






− ZK1 − Zi1
Z1
σ1 (Z1) .
Since the righthand side is bounded above by 1, a sufficient condition for the merger to be
unprofitable is that k <
(
nL + nM − 2
)
/2. The reverse of this inequality is then a necessary
condition for the merger to be profitable. 
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Online Appendix: Not for Publication
Sufficient Conditions for Consumer Surplus to Increase Absent Synergies. We
examine when a merger increases Z2 by enough that overall consumer surplus goes up.
To simplify the exposition we focus on the case where before the merger all firms supply a
single product, and nH ≥ 1 of them supply high-quality products.
Our first result utilizes the concept of an “infinitesimal merger” involving two firms (intro-
duced by Farrell and Shapiro (1990)). One firm is the acquirer and the other is the “target”,
with the target having weakly higher costs than the acquirer for both products. Because of
this assumption on costs a merger is equivalent to removing the target from the market. We
define an infinitesimal merger as a small exogenous reduction in the target firm’s output,
beginning from the pre-merger industry configuration, with all other firms including the
acquirer adjusting their own outputs in response, resulting in a new industry equilibrium.
Consumer surplus given outputs Z1 and Z2 is∫
θ(Z1)
[v (θ, qL)− P1 (Z1)] dF (θ) +
∫
θ(Z2)
[(v (θ, qH)− v (θ, qL))− P2 (Z2)] dF (θ) . (37)
Letting dZ1 and dZ2 be the changes in baseline and upgrade output from an infinitesimal
merger, the associated change in consumer surplus is
dCS = −Z1P ′1(Z1)dZ1 − Z2P ′2(Z2)dZ2. (38)
Suppose the target firm supplies low-quality products before the merger. We know from









H − σ2(Z2) + 1] + P ′1(Z1)
dZ1. (39)
Combining equations (38) and (39) we obtain the following result.
Lemma 7. Suppose there are no multiproduct firms. An infinitesimal merger in which the
target firm supplies only low-quality products increases consumer surplus if and only if the








− nH + Z2
Z1
σ1(Z1) < 0. (40)
















− nH + Z2
Z1
σ1(Z1). (42)
Note that τ1 > 0 and dZ1 < 0, so dCS > 0 if and only if τ2 < 0 i.e. condition (40) holds. 
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Consistent with arguments in Section 3, Lemma 7 shows that an infinitesimal merger is
more likely to increase consumer surplus when σ1(Z1) is small and σ2(Z2) is large.
35 All else
equal, condition (40) is harder to satisfy when there are more high-quality firms.36 Notice
also that—conditional on Z1—the number of low-quality firms does not affect the sensitivity
of upgrade supply to changes in baseline output, and for this reason does not directly enter
into condition (40).
Our second results pertain to complete mergers. If we were to start with an infinitesimal
merger and then continue reducing the target firm’s output to zero, then by integrating
the associated output changes over the whole sequence we would arrive at the post-merger
equilibrium outputs. We now use this insight to provide conditions under which a complete
merger increases consumer surplus.
As a preliminary remark, notice that when a low-quality target firm has a sufficiently small
market share—such that a merger will change Z1 and Z2 by a sufficiently small amount—then
by continuity condition (40) ensures that consumer surplus goes up.
Now consider mergers between firms with arbitrary market shares. To simplify, we assume
that the nH firms have a cost of supplying low-quality products that is so large that they
will never choose to do so (regardless of how the merger changes Z1 and Z2).
37
Proposition 15. Suppose there are no multiproduct firms, and that the demand system
exhibits constant curvatures σ1 ≤ 0 and σ2 ≤ 0. A merger involving two low-quality firms
raises consumer surplus provided that condition (40) holds at the pre-merger equilibrium.
Proof. Let Z∗1 and Z
∗∗
1 denote pre- and post-merger total outputs respectively. As we reduce




1 and Z2 re-
equilibrates. Using equation (39) Z2 increases. Let Z
∗
2 denote pre-merger upgrades. Notice
that at each point on the sequence at least one firm produces high-quality. (No firm that
was low-quality prior to the merger will supply upgrades because Z2 > Z
∗
2 . But if no other
firm produces high-quality this contradicts Z2 > Z
∗
2 .) Therefore using the proof of Lemma



















where we write nH(Z1) because the number of firms supplying high-quality products may
vary along the sequence. Since τ1 > 0 it is sufficient to prove that the curly-bracketed term
is negative at all points along the sequence. Firstly, the curly-bracketed term is increasing
in nH(Z1), and at all points along the sequence n
H(Z1) ≤ nH(Z∗1) ≡ nH ; to see the latter,
recall that along the sequence Z2 increases and therefore no previously low-quality firm has
an incentive to supply any upgrades. Secondly, fixing the nH terms, the curly-bracketed
35Note that a necessary condition for inequality (40) to hold is that σ2(Z2) > σ1(Z1) + 1, ruling out linear demands.
36Precisely, if nH increases but costs are adjusted in such a way that Z1 and Z2 remain the same.
37Technically this may require high-quality firm i’s cost to satisfy ci1 > c
i
2 which is counter to what we assumed in
the main paper. However it is a simple way to ensure that firms remain single-product along the whole sequence. It
might hold if the firm needs to degrade its high-quality product in order to supply a low-quality variant.
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term is increasing in Z1. This is because Z1/Z2 and Z2σ1/Z1 are both increasing, and also
the derivative of P ′1(Z1)/P
′













where the inequality follows because σ1, σ2 ≤ 0 implies P ′′1 (Z1), P ′′2 (Z2) ≤ 0. 
Proposition 15 provides conditions such that if an infinitesimal merger raises consumer sur-
plus then so does a complete merger. We note that it is straightforward to construct v(θ, qL)
and v(θ, qH) such that baseline and upgrade demands have constant (but different) curva-
tures, condition (40) is satisfied at pre-merger equilibrium, and a complete merger between
two low-quality firms is privately profitable.
